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Evidence on the interdependency between monetary policy and the state of the
banking system is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro-macro approach with two
core virtues. First, we measure the probability of bank distress directly at the bank
level. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a
standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate
micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback ef-
fects between bank distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German
bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results con￿rm the existence of
a relationship between monetary policy and bank distress. A monetary contraction
increases the mean probability of distress. This e￿ect disappears when neglecting
micro e￿ects, underlining the crucial importance of the former. Distress responses
are economically most signi￿cant for weak distress events and at times when capi-
talization is low.
Keywords: Stress testing, bank distress, monetary policy
JEL: E42, E52, E58, G21, G28Non-technical summary
Empirical evidence on the interdependency between monetary policy and distress
in the banking system is virtually absent from the academic literature. On the one
hand, information on the soundness of ￿nancial institutions is usually not publicly
available. On the other hand, the theoretical implications of monetary policies on
banking distress are largely unknown.
This paper provides evidence for the largest economy in the European Monetary
Union: Germany. First, we calculate probabilities of bank distress at the microeco-
nomic level. Distress is de￿ned very broadly. It ranges from (many) weak incidences,
such as disclosure of facts pursuant to the Banking Act, to (a few) absorbing events,
such as restructuring mergers. Next to bank-speci￿c covariates, probabilities of dis-
tress (PDs) are estimated with a hazard rate model augmented with macroeconomic
covariates: output growth, in￿ation, and interest rates. Second, we specify a tradi-
tional vector autoregressive (VAR) model for those macroeconomic aggregates that
also includes the aggregate PD of the banking system as an additional exogenous
variable to estimate impulse response functions following a monetary shock. Third,
we combine both layers by augmenting the VAR model with a fourth equation cap-
turing the PD based on bank-level data. The combined model allows for feedback
e￿ects between the ￿nancial and monetary stance. Our main results are as follows.
A monetary contraction by one standard deviation leads to a signi￿cant, but
small, increase in the aggregate PD. This result con￿rms the link between monetary
policy and banking distress. The signi￿cant response of bank PDs to monetary policy
vanishes when disregarding feedback e￿ects. Consequently, the importance to allow
for feedback e￿ects of monetary policy changes at the bank level is crucial.
This result is due to a signi￿cant response of weak distress events. Instead, the PD
of stronger distress events does not respond signi￿cantly to a monetary shock. This
suggests that drastic distress, which implies the bank to cease as a going concern,
is primarily driven by bank-speci￿c traits rather than macroeconomic conditions or
monetary policy.
Based on the integrated micro-macro model, we analyze the consequences of a
monetary shock for two capitalization scenarios. We compare impulse responses as-
suming that the capitalization of the banking system is one standard deviation below
the observed historical mean capitalization with impulse responses where capitaliza-
tion is assumed to be one standard deviation higher then observed. This comparison
shows that impulse responses are around six times larger in the ’low’ capitaliza-
tion scenario compared to the ’high’ capitalization scenario. This corroborates also
￿ndings in the bank lending channel literature that emphasize that monetary trans-
mission varies according to cross-sectional di￿erences of ￿nancial intermediaries.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Der Zusammenhang zwischen Geldpolitik und der Stabilit￿t individueller Banken
ist weitgehend unerforscht. Dies liegt einerseits daran, dass die theoretischen Auswir-
kungen geldpolitischer Entscheidungen auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer ’Schie￿age’
bei Banken weitgehend im Dunkeln liegen. Au￿erdem sind Daten zur Stabilit￿t
einzelner Finanzdienstleister meist nicht ￿￿entlich zug￿nglich.
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht diesen Zusammenhang f￿r die gr￿￿te Volks-
wirtschaft in der Europ￿ischen W￿hrungsunion: Deutschland. Zuerst sch￿tzen wir
mit Hilfe eines Risikomodells die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer ’Schie￿age’ von Banken
(PDs). Dabei wird Schie￿age sehr breit de￿niert. Dieses Ma￿ beinhaltet nicht nur
Marktaustritte, z.B. auf Grund von Restrukturierungsfusionen, sondern insbeson-
dere auch schw￿chere Probleme, wie z.B Anzeigen nach ￿29(3) KWG, die auf eine
Beeintr￿chtigung der Entwicklung oder Bestandsgef￿hrdung hinweisen. PDs h￿ngen
neben bankspezi￿schen auch von makro￿konomischen Gr￿￿en ab: Wirtschaftswachs-
tum, In￿ation und Zinsen. Zun￿chst spezi￿zieren wir ein traditionelles Vektorautore-
gressives (VAR) Modell einschlie￿lich der mittleren PD als erkl￿rende Variable,
um realwirtschaftliche Reaktionen in Folge eines geldpolitischen Schocks zu quan-
ti￿zieren. Schlie￿lich kombinieren wir die mikro- und makro￿konomischen Kom-
ponenten in einem integriertem VAR Modell, welches eine PD Gleichung enth￿lt.
Hiermit ist es uns m￿glich, R￿ckkopplungse￿ekte zuzulassen und deren Bedeutung
zu analysieren.
Unsere Ergebnisse best￿tigen, dass eine geldpolitische Stra￿ung von einer Stan-
dardabweichung einen signi￿kanten Anstieg der mittleren PD bewirkt, die selbst
aber gering ist. Dieser Zusammenhang ist allerdings statistisch nur dann nachweis-
bar, wenn R￿ckkopplungse￿ekte explizit modelliert werden und unterstreichen daher
deren gro￿e Bedeutung.
Dieser Befund ist das Ergebnis eines signi￿kanten Anstiegs ’schwacher Probleme’.
Dagegen reagiert die Wahrscheinlichkeit ’gravierender Probleme’ nicht signi￿kant auf
einen monet￿ren Schock. Es ist anzunehmen, dass schwere Ereignisse, welche die Ein-
stellung der Gesch￿ftst￿tigkeit bedeuten, im Wesentlichen auf bankspezi￿sche Fak-
toren und nicht auf makro￿konomische bzw. geldpolitische Schocks zur￿ckzuf￿hren
sind.
Auf der Basis des integrierten Mikro-Makro Modells untersuchen wir die Auswir-
kungen eines monet￿ren Schocks f￿r zwei Eigenkapitalszenarien. Wir vergleichen
Impulsantworten unter der Annahme, dass das Bankensystem eine um eine Stan-
dardabweichung schw￿chere Eigenkapitalisierung aufweist mit den Impulsantworten
unter der Annahme, dass das Bankensystem eine um eine Standardabweichung
h￿here Eigenkapitalisierung aufweist. Dieser Vergleich zeigt, dass Impulsantworten
des ’schwachen’ Szenarios etwa um das Sechsfache h￿her ausfallen als jene des ’ho-
hen’ Eigenkapitalisierungsszenarios. Dieses Ergebnis steht im Einklang mit der Lit-
eratur zum Bankkreditkanal, wonach die geldpolitische Transmission auch von Un-
terschieden zwischen den Finanzintermedi￿ren abh￿ngt.Contents
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An Integrated Micro-Macro Approach 1
1 Introduction
This paper investigates interactions between banking sector distress and the real
economy. Thereby, we seek to contribute empirical evidence to the ongoing debate
among policy makers (ECB, 2006; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2006), academics (Benink
and Benston, 2005; Goodhart et al., 2006) and the public (The Economist, 2007),
concerning the extent macroeconomic policies and banking system soundness depend
on each other. Speci￿cally, we investigate how monetary policy a￿ects banks’ prob-
abilities of distress and quantify the importance of feedback mechanisms between
the real and ￿nancial sector.
The increasing interest in the relation between monetary policy and the sound-
ness of the ￿nancial sector (Oosterloo et al., 2007) is presumably owed to a fairly
successful record to control in￿ation, but increasing concerns regarding the latter
(Borio, 2006). In addition, if the stability of individual banks di￿ers, this is likely
to a￿ect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, too. For example, Kishan
and Opiela (2000) demonstrate that loan supply of poorly capitalized banks reacts
more sensitively compared to well capitalized peers.
Empirical evidence on the intricate relation between monetary policy and bank
distress is, however, still scarce. A number of scholars emphasize the important role
of banks (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Padoa-Schioppa, 2003; Schinasi and Fell,
2005). But while many studies analyze individual banks’ probabilities of default, 2
Jacobson et al. (2005) highlight that only few studies employ microeconomic indica-
tors, such as PDs of ￿rms and/or banks, as a link to monetary policy and resulting
PD responses. Related, Goodhart et al. (2004, 2006) emphasize the interdependence
of microeconomic agents and macroeconomic performance. Thus, allowing for feed-
back mechanisms is essential (ECB, 2006).
We aim to make two core contributions. First, we develop an integrated micro-
macro approach that incorporates bank-level information into the assessment of
macroeconomic shocks and PD responses. Second, we allow explicitly for feedback
mechanisms between both the macroeconomic stance and the microeconomic sound-
ness of banks. Contrary to extant research, our approach is agnostic about both the
timing and direction of the feedback mechanisms.
1ferre.degraeve@ugent.be (F. De Graeve), thomas.kick@bundesbank.de (T. Kick) and m.koetter@rug.nl (M.
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1To this end we use macroeconomic and individual data for all universal banks
operating in Germany. We analyze which di￿erent types of distressed events oc-
cur more frequently following a monetary policy shock on the basis of con￿dential
Bundesbank bank data between 1995 and 2004. We construct a reduced form micro-
macro model which describes the convolution of bank distress probabilities at the
micro-level and the macroeconomy. There are a number of reasons to combine the
micro and macro perspectives. In a pure macro model, many potentially relevant ef-
fects may be obscured due to the loss of information following data aggregation. We
￿nd that this e￿ect is substantial. A model based only on ￿nancial sector aggregates
misleadingly suggests macro-￿nancial feedback to be absent. Moreover, it is not al-
ways straightforward to assess how aggregate ￿uctuations are related to individual
bank distress. In turn, with a pure micro approach it is di￿cult to interpret move-
ments in aggregate variables. Many macro stress-testing exercises incorporate the
real economy by specifying some unconditional distribution for aggregate variables.
A ￿rst drawback of this approach is to preclude ￿nancial-macro feedback, also called
second-round e￿ects. Second, there is no straightforward economic interpretation of
the macro ￿uctuations, for example in terms of structural shocks. Both are desirable
features of models suited for macro stress-testing (Goodhart, 2006; ECB, 2006).
The microeconometric part of the model links probabilities of bank distress to
both bank-speci￿c and macroeconomic variables. We then combine this model with
a macro model describing the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables, as
well as their interaction with the ￿nancial sector. Subsequently, we identify mon-
etary policy shocks in the combined micro-macro system. That is, we identify the
reduced form in order to understand the e￿ects of structural shocks. Our approach
allows for macro-￿nancial as well as ￿nancial-macro feedback dynamics. Moreover,
this feedback can be both instantaneous and subject to non-linearities. Model simu-
lations provide insight into the complex interdependence between macro shocks and
microeconomic bank PDs. This model allows us to measure the interactions between
monetary policy and bank distress more explicitly compared to previous studies. Our
study is thus akin to Jacobson et al. (2005), who analyze interactions between the
Swedish macroeconomy and the corporate sector using vector autoregressive (VAR)
techniques combined with probabilities of distress of individual ￿rms derived from
a hazard rate model.
We di￿er, however, in four important respects. First, we use con￿dential data
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank to estimate bank rather than corporate ￿rm
distress from a panel of bank-speci￿c ￿nancial data and distress events. Second, we
disaggregate our measure of distress and according responses to monetary policy
shocks with respect to di￿erent degrees of distress. Third, we di￿er substantially in
the way in which we treat the combined micro-macro-system. Our study contributes
methodologically by incorporating simultaneity in the macro-￿nancial interactions.
We extend the VAR by a data generating process for distressed events, which is
estimated on micro bank data. This combined system resembles a reduced form
panel-VAR. We apply identi￿cation techniques to this combined micro-macro system
(i.e. construct a SVAR) to analyze the e￿ect of structural shocks. Importantly, we
do so without imposing any a priori restrictions on the direction or the timing
of interactions between the macroeconomy and the banking sector, but let the data
determine their outcome. Fourth, we analyze the largest economy in Europe, namely
Germany.
2Our main result is that a contraction in monetary policy increases the average
probability of distress of banks by 0.44%, which resembles a third of it’s annual
standard deviation. Hence, the e￿ect is economically signi￿cant and con￿rms the
interdependency between monetary policy and the state of the banking system. Sec-
ond, allowing for feedback e￿ects and non-linearities is crucial. Without modeling
individual bank distress probabilities’ reaction to the macroeconomy, a contraction
of monetary policy has no signi￿cant e￿ect on PDs. Consequently, studies that ne-
glect the integral role played by microeconomic agents may falsely fail to detect
the interdependency between monetary policy and bank health. Third, distinguish-
ing di￿erent degrees of distress and banking sectors yield heterogeneous responses.
Moreover, the e￿ects of monetary policy on banking distress are more severe when
banks are poorly capitalized. To the extent that banking distress carries over to
banks’ lending behavior, this is in line with the bank lending channel literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present our data in
section 2 and discuss the components of the micro-macro model subsequently in
section 3. Our results in section 4 are reported for aggregate measures of distress
and, in addition, according to distress level. We conclude in section 5.
2 Data
The analysis pertains to the German economy and its banking system over the period
1995-2004. We use the distress database of the Bundesbank to model bank distress,
which is particularly insightful for our questions of research. 3 Often, macro stress-
tests focus on credit risk alone. According to Aspachs et al. (2007), the probability
of distress is a much more appealing statistic because it provides a more exhaustive
picture of stress borne by the banking system since it considers all types of risk.
The German banking sector experienced substantial ￿uctuations in the occurrence
of distressed events. The sample contains more than 1,100 events and the aggregate
annual frequency of distress ￿uctuates approximately between 2 and 7% as shown
in table 1.
Table 1: Annual distress frequency according to distress category
Year All Distress categories
I II III IV
1995 1.9% 0.1% 0.4% 0.8% 0.6%
1996 2.5% 0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 0.7%
1997 3.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.9% 1.7%
1998 4.7% 0.1% 1.4% 1.3% 1.9%
1999 5.6% 0.2% 2.4% 0.9% 2.1%
2000 5.0% 0.1% 2.2% 1.0% 1.7%
2001 6.9% 0.8% 3.1% 1.1% 1.9%
2002 7.0% 1.2% 3.3% 0.9% 1.6%
2003 6.6% 0.8% 3.4% 1.1% 1.3%
2004 4.1% 0.5% 2.5% 0.8% 0.3%
Obs 26,012 24,967 25,325 25,131 25,226
We observe di￿erences across distress categories in our sample period. Therefore,
3See also Porath (2006), Kick and Koetter (2007), and Koetter et al. (2007).
3we disentangle below responses of probabilities of distress to monetary shocks and
depict next to the aggregate distress frequencies according splits in table 1, too.
Regarding di￿erent distress categories, Oshinsky and Olin (2006) point out that
banks hardly ever face a dichotomous destiny of either failure or survival. Instead, a
number of di￿erent shades of distress can occur to a bank. Based on detailed data on
approximately 60 di￿erent possible events collected by the Bundesbank, we distin-
guish four increasingly severe classes of distress labeled I through IV in table 1. 4 The
￿rst group of weakest events includes three incidents. First, compulsory noti￿cations
by banks about events that may jeopardize the existence of the bank as a going con-
cern according to ￿29(3) of the German Banking act ("KWG" ). Second, a noti￿ca-
tion by banks of losses amounting to 25 percent of liable capital according to ￿24(1)5
KWG. Third, weak measures like letters of warning. The second distress category
captures measures taken by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ( "BaFin")
representing o￿cial warnings, admonishment hearings, disapproval, warnings to the
CEO, and serious letters. None of these measures imply an active intrusion into the
ongoing operations of the bank. In turn, category III represents corrective actions
against the bank such as orders to restructure operations, restrictions to lending,
deposit taking, equity withdrawal or pro￿t distribution or the dismissal of manage-
ment. The fourth (and worst) distress category comprises takeovers classi￿ed by the
Bundesbank as restructuring mergers and enforced closures of banks initiated by the
BaFin, which are extremely rare. The pattern depicted in table 1 highlights that in
particular weaker distress events occurred more often in recent years. Potentially,
weaker incidents are more likely during monetary contraction but structural dis-
tress, such as market exit through mergers, may not be a￿ected by such temporary
phenomena but depend on fundamental de￿ciencies of the bank. We therefore test
below if responses do di￿er across distress categories.
3 Methodology and auxiliary results
We ￿rst introduce the hazard rate model to estimate bank PDs. We use a logit
model that relates bank-speci￿c probabilities of distress to bank-speci￿c as well as
macroeconomic conditions. Subsequently, we discuss our speci￿cation of the reduced
form macro model. The macro model is a VAR for key macroeconomic aggregates
similar to Jacobson et al. (2005). They identify a monetary policy shock in the macro
model and verify its impact on the micro ￿nancial model. The ￿nancial impact
then may a￿ect macro developments in a subsequent period. In a third subsection
we combine the reduced form micro and macro models in a way that di￿ers from
Jacobson et al. (2005). In particular, we combine the reduced form micro and macro
models in one integrated system. We then identify shocks in the combined micro-
macro system. This has two virtues relative to the approach of Jacobson et al.
(2005). First, the identi￿cation of the shock takes into account the ￿nancial e￿ect,
as well as possible non-linearities. Second, we do not need to make assumptions about
the timing of real-￿nancial interactions, an attractive feature given the absence of a
(theoretical) consensus regarding ￿nancial sector interactions with the real economy.
4Next to the annual distress database of the Bundesbank, we also use three subset databases
with exact dates ("measures", "incidents" and "mergers") to construct below a quarterly series of
the distress indicator for reasons explained in section 3.2.
43.1 A microeconomic measure of ￿nancial distress
The microeconomic component of our integrated model captures the driving forces
of the probability of distress (PD) among banks. In particular, we estimate the
conditional probability of distress with a logit model:
PDit =
eβXit−1+πZt−1
1 + eβXit−1+πZt−1. (1)
Here, PDit denotes the probability that bank i will be distressed in year t. It is
estimated from a set of covariates Xit−1 observed for bank i in period t − 1 and,
additionally, a set of macroeconomic covariates Zt−1, where β and π are parameters
to estimate. The micro model transforms a set of bank-speci￿c and macroeconomic
covariates observed in year t − 1 into bank-speci￿c PD0s with an appropriate link
function, in our case a logit link function. 5
Since the number of bank-speci￿c covariates to include in X is possibly immense,
we follow the procedure suggested in Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) and pre-select
an economically meaningful long-list of around 150 covariates. We orient ourselves
at the rating practices followed by supervisory authorities, which use the so-called
CAMEL taxonomy (King et al., 2006). 6 Within each category we conduct univari-
ate tests to identify a shortlist of covariates that maximize explanatory power. 7
Ultimately, we select a ￿nal vector of seven bank-speci￿c and three macroeconomic
variables by means of stepwise regression. Descriptive statistics according to distress
category are provided in table 5 in the appendix.
More importantly in the light of our study is the inclusion of three macroeco-
nomic covariates (Zt = (Y,P,R)
0
t, denoting respectively output growth, in￿ation
and the interest rate) as an additional category of its own. These are included to
establish the link with the macroeconomic VAR model. Moreover, the evolution of
both bank-speci￿c and macroeconomic covariates over time, depicted in ￿gure 7 in
the appendix, shows that no individual model component alone appear to perfectly
coincide with observed distress events. 8 This corroborates Porath’s (2006) point that
macroeconomic and bank-speci￿c covariates are jointly relevant to predict bank dis-
tress. Consider ￿rst the hazard rate model in equation (1) for the sample pooled
across distress categories depicted in table 6.
This hazard rate model exhibits a good ￿t as witnessed by a pseudo-R 2 of ap-
proximately 11 percent. This is on the low side compared to Jacobson et al. (2005),
who report aggregated (Laitila) pseudo-R 2s calculated for the full sample between
16 and 39%.9 While these are in line with results reported in other corporate failure
5The link function transforms the variables’ e￿ects into probabilities. The particular choice for
a logit essentially leaves our results una￿ected (see also Porath, 2006). Based on standard lag
selection criteria, we use one year lags for all variables.
6CAMEL: Capitalization, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity.
7For a more detailed description of model selection for Bundesbank data see Porath (2006),
Koetter et al. (2007) and Kick and Koetter (2007).
8We discuss the respective contribution to the discriminatory power of the micro model in more
detail below.
9We check if this could be attributed to our choice of one year lags for all covariates in the bank
hazard model, i.e. including macro covariates, which di￿ers from the contemporaneous speci￿cation
of macro terms in Jacobson et al. (2005). This turns out to be not the case since R2 declines to
10.6 % in the latter speci￿cation.
5studies, our goodness of ￿t measure is fairly well in line with international bank
failure studies (see for example Ramirez 2003 reporting R2 between 6 and 13%) and
previous studies on German bank distress. 10 Hence, the di￿erence of these measures
may merely re￿ect the di￿erent hazard rate models, namely corporate versus bank
distress, respectively.
Finally, Wooldridge (2002) and Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) caution not to
over-emphasize pseudo-R2s to assess the adequacy of limited dependent models. In
fact, the ability of hazard rate models to correctly discern events from non-events is
crucial. The classi￿cation of predicted events depends on the probability cuto￿ level
beyond which an observation is assigned to either one of these classes. In contrast
to studies reporting type I and II classi￿cation errors (Kolari et al., 2002), we follow
Hosmer and Lemshow (2000) and evaluate the discriminatory power of the model
over the range of alternative cuto￿ levels between zero and one by means of the
area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve. The area under the
ROC curve (AUR) measures the percentage of correctly classi￿ed events (sensitivity)
versus one minus the percentage of correctly classi￿ed non-events (speci￿city). It is
thus more general and informative compared to type I and II errors or R2.
According to Hosmer and Lemshow (2000), the reported AUR values of around
77 percent indicate a good ability of this model to discriminate successfully be-
tween distressed and non-distressed events. Even though our prime interest is not
in individual parameter estimates, it is comforting that virtually all coe￿cients are
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero and exhibit signs and magnitudes in line with other
bank failure studies. We also depict parameter estimates for distress group-speci￿c
logit models in the right-hand panels of table 6. Like the aggregate model, each
speci￿cation exhibits fairly high AUR values. Since our prime focus in this paper
is to assess the e￿ects of monetary policy on bank distress, we refrain from further
inference and turn next to the macroeconomic component of the model.
Table 2 sheds light on the importance of incorporating the macroeconomic vari-
ables in the micro model. The table compares two measures of ￿t across our baseline
model with and without macro covariates. 11
Table 2: The contribution of macro covariates to discern bank-speci￿c distress
All Distress Category
I II III IV
A-RMSE
Micro only 0.015 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.006
Micro and macro 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.003
Reduction (%) 28.45 43.12 14.41 27.92 40.44
AUR
Micro only 0.77 0.83 0.72 0.85 0.78
Micro and macro 0.77 0.84 0.74 0.85 0.80
Gain (%) 1.04 1.09 2.30 0.00 1.62
Notes: A-RMSE: Aggregate root mean squared error; AUR: Area un-
der the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve.
10For example, Koetter et al. (2007) and Kick and Koetter (2007) report R2 between 11 and
13%, respectively.
11Parameter estimates without macro variables are in table 7 in the appendix.
6Including macro variables helps the micro model in two important ways. First,
consider the aggregate root mean-squared errors (A-RMSE). This measure re￿ects
the success of both models in capturing the aggregate rate of distress over time.
Macro variables reduce projection errors by at least 14 and up to 40 percent. Second,
table 2 also contains a measure that re￿ects the cross-sectional ￿t of the model with
and without macro variables: the AUR. Here, we also see that incorporating macro
covariates improves the cross-sectional success of the model.
This model comparison exercise implies, ￿rst, that the macro variables improve
the estimation of the marginal e￿ects of the hazard rate model. Importantly, the
identi￿cation of macro e￿ects requires both the micro (cross-section) and macro
(time series) dimension (Porath, 2006). This reduces potential concerns with respect
to the fairly short time-series dimension of the data. Second, the success of the
model in reproducing the aggregate distress rate is intimately tied to the inclusion
of macroeconomic information. This result is in line with Jacobson et al. (2005),
who also highlight the crucial importance to include macro variables when ￿tting a
default model for Swedish ￿rms to capture aggregate movements.
3.2 The macroeconomic model
The macro block of the model is a standard vector autoregressive model (VAR),
describing the convolution of the most important macroeconomic aggregates. We
incorporate ￿nancial-macro feedback by allowing these macro variables to depend
on our measure of bank distress. We favor a VAR approach for a number of rea-
sons. First, reduced form VARs typically perform very well in capturing the data
generating process of macro-aggregates, and the German data are no exception.
Second, the interactions between ￿nancial distress and the real economy have not
been rigorously identi￿ed theoretically. Goodhart et al. (2006) is a very important
contribution toward this goal. However, a consensus view on these interactions has
yet to emerge as pointed out by, for instance, the European Central Bank (2005).
The contemporaneous and lagged intricate relation between the real economy and
the banking sector is hardly to be measured with a theory based approach without
either heroic assumptions or sole focus on single market segments, such as for ex-
ample aggregate lending. We therefore aim to impose as little a priori theorizing as
possible. VARs render the most ￿exible way to do so. 12
Speci￿cally, the macroeconomic model consists of a quarterly VAR for GDP
growth (Y ), in￿ation (P) and the interest rate (R). Any macro analysis of monetary
policy issues typically includes (at least) these three variables. Here, in view of the
interest in banking sector soundness, the probability of bank-distress (measured
by the frequency of distressed events) is incorporated as an additional explanatory
12Though complete structural models also have a VAR representation, they comprise many more
cross-equation restrictions. Precisely because of the lack of consensus on such restrictions within a
framework for ￿nancial distress, we refrain from imposing them.
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Where the Π matrices capture the reduced form feedback coe￿cients from macro
to macro (ΠMM, dimension 3 × 3) and from the ￿nancial sector to the macro side
(ΠMF, 3 × 1), respectively.
3.3 The integrated micro-macro model
The two models described in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 incorporate both macroeco-
nomic as well as ￿nancial features. First, the VAR captures relations among the
macro variables. In addition, it also includes the dependency of the macroeconomic
aggregates on our measure of ￿nancial distress, or ￿nancial-macro feedback. The
evolution of ￿nancial distress is itself captured in the micro model. As also shown
by Jacobson et al. (2005), it is vital to take account of a number of features in
estimating the determinants of the degree of distress. First, there is a role for macro
covariates to explain distress risk over time and in the cross-section, in addition to
the explanatory value of individual characteristics. The micro model therefore aug-
ments the traditional distress speci￿cation with macroeconomic variables. Second,
the e￿ects of the macro variables on distress may be ill-measured when micro-data
are ignored. Therefore, we measure the impact of the macroeconomic variables on
distress in a model that takes into account the micro-data explicitly. Third, the prob-
ability of distress is typically non-linearly related to its determinants. For example,
reducing capitalization from 12 to 11% has di￿erent e￿ects on the probability of
distress compared to a situation in which it is reduced from 8 to 7%. Moreover, the
inherent non-linearity in the logit equation (1) also allows the model to articulate
concerns as, for example, the sensitivity of distress to macro-economic ￿uctuations
may depend on the bank’s bu￿er holdings of capital. In the following sections, we
combine the two models into an integrated one. The properties of the individual
models carry over to the integrated model. In order to provide a measure for the
importance of these properties, Section 4.2, presents a model that disregards mi-
cro data and non-linearities. The latter model amounts to a standard four-variable
VAR, in which the data generating process for distress is both linear and estimated
on aggregate distress data.
3.3.1 The reduced form
After describing both the micro and macro blocks of the model, we now focus on the
combined model. Note that the model in equation (2) is a plain VAR augmented with
the PD as an additional explanatory variable. Put di￿erently, this model does not
incorporate any feedback mechanism from macroeconomic conditions to the ￿nancial
sector. Therefore, we expand the macro system with one equation, namely the data
13For expositional purposes, we write the system as a ￿rst order VAR. The implementation of
the approach, however, does not constrain lag length.
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Put di￿erently, the fourth equation of the combined model describes the relation be-
tween the probability of distress and the macro variables. The bank-speci￿c variables
are considered as exogenous for the combined model. 14 They do, however, retain an
important role in the model. That is, the coe￿cients ΠFM are the marginal e￿ects
of the macro variables on the ￿nancial sector, i.e. the frequency of distressed events.
These marginal e￿ects depend on the level of each of the variables in the micro
model. For example, the elasticity of distress with respect to output depends, among
other CAMEL covariates, on bank capitalization. The same holds for all variables in
the system. Moreover, as output changes, all the marginal e￿ects dynamically change
along. Thus, the model allows for the possibility of state-dependent coe￿cients, such
as dependence on the balance sheet of the ￿nancial sector, an experiment we conduct
in section 4.5.15
Considering the micro component in the integrated VAR improves the ￿t con-
siderably as shown by the improvement of aggregate RMSE in table 3.
Table 3: The contribution of micro to the integrated VAR
All Distress Category
I II III IV
A-RMSE
Macro only (VAR) 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.005
Micro and macro 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.003
Reduction (%) 31.00 81.43 18.59 68.38 28.08
Notes: A-RMSE: Aggregate root mean squared error.
Note, that in contrast to the comparison of hazard rate models before, we com-
pare here the integrated model relative to a plain VAR merely augmented with the
frequency of distress as an additional endogenous variable. The improvement of 31%
underpins that the micro model also improves the description of the aggregate dis-
tress rate relative to a speci￿cation including macro only, i.e. a plain VAR. This
substantial gain highlights the importance of accounting for both micro information
and non-linearities, which help to capture the dynamics of the aggregate distress
rate.
3.3.2 The structural form
Note the following about the structure of the combined micro-macro model (3).
First, the model is a reduced form. It combines two lower layer reduced form models,
14Therefore, they do not appear as separate variables in the combined dynamic system. We aim
to endogenize banks’ balance sheets in future research.
15We illustrate this procedure with an example in appendix A.
9in which no contemporaneous relations among the variables exist. The absence of
such interactions is what crucially distinguishes this model from a structural model.
Second, the model ￿ts into a panel-VAR type framework. That is, all variables are
explained in terms of lags of themselves and all other variables in the system. In
fact, the model is a mixed panel-VAR since the macro variables are measured in
the aggregate, while the probability of distress is measured at the cross-sectional
bank-level.
Acknowledging this structure of the combined model, one can transform this
reduced form into a structural form using standard identi￿cation techniques. Similar
to transforming a reduced form VAR to a structural one (SVAR), one can identify the
above combined micro-macro system. A complete structural model, as in equation
(4) below, describes the entire set of relations (both contemporaneous ( A, 4 × 4)
and lagged (B, 4×4)) between all variables in the system, and thus the response to


























We partially identify the combined micro-macro system. In particular, we identify
a monetary policy shock. Intuitively, we look for all possible structural models that
satisfy, ￿rst, the reduced form combined micro-macro model in equation (3) and,
second, what we "know" happens after a monetary policy shock. 16 Regarding the
latter, we de￿ne a policy shock as one which initially has a positive e￿ect on the
interest rate, while neither increasing growth nor in￿ation ( R > 0,Y ≤ 0,P ≤ 0).
This is a common set of restrictions in the macro literature (Peersman, 2005).
We identify monetary policy shocks using sign restrictions rather than a recur-
sive identi￿cation scheme. There are, within the current setup, a number of reasons
for doing so. First, this approach naturally extends into considering other types of
structural shocks, such as demand and supply shocks (Peersman, 2005). Though be-
yond the scope of this paper, identifying other shocks may be of particular interest
in stress-testing exercises. Second, note that the restrictions we impose (R rises, Y
and P do not fall) nest the recursive (or Choleski) response. In a recursive identi￿-
cation scheme the imposed instantaneous response is that R rises, while Y=0 and
P=0. In that sense, our identi￿cation is more general, relative to that of Jacobson
et al. (2005). The approach di￿ers in an important additional respect. The model of
Jacobson et al. (2005) does not allow for any contemporaneous feedback from the
￿nancial side to the real economy. Our model can encompass such e￿ects. The ab-
sence of widely accepted theoretical priors regarding the relation of ￿nancial distress
and monetary policy underpins that such feedback e￿ects should not be precluded a
priori. The advantage of sign restrictions is that we can remain fully agnostic about
the distress response to a monetary policy shock. A ￿nal virtue of the use of sign
restrictions is related to the periodicity of the data. Our baseline model is annual in
16As a caveat, note that we do not model to what extent monetary policy might have been
induced by stability shocks of the banking industry, for example as a reaction to turmoils recently
observed in the wake of the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. ￿nancial system. This relates to the
prevailing theoretical ambiguity as how to identify alternative shocks in general and we deem the
issue out of the present paper’s scope.
10frequency. Many of the more traditional exclusion restrictions are only reasonable
for higher frequencies.
3.4 Periodicity of distress
The data used to estimate the micro and macro models presented above have di￿er-
ent frequencies. While the micro model is based on annual data, VARs are typically
estimated on higher frequency data, quarterly in our case. The di￿erent periodicity
is dealt with as follows. We estimate the reduced forms of the micro model (1) and
the macro (2) model separately. Prior to combining the two models, we convert the
VAR to its annual form. This makes the frequency equal for both models, enabling
their combination. An alternative approach could combine the models at the quar-
terly frequency. However, because such approaches are very demanding in terms
of time series dimension of the data, we combine the models at the lower, annual
frequency.
Quarterly estimation of the macro component of the model requires us to trans-
form the annual distress measure to a quarterly series by employing an according
indicator. The latter is constructed from three sub-databases of the annual distress
catalogue of the Bundesbank, which indicate speci￿c dates for individual measures
("Ma￿nahmen"), incidents ("Vorkomnisse") and (distressed) mergers. While these
subsets cover around 75 percent of all events speci￿ed in equation (1), the quarterly
distress indicator is thus an approximation. 17 Akin to Hoggarth et al. (2005), we use
the former as a weighting scheme to distribute the annual distress series to quarters.
Because there remains some periodicity 18, the quarterly series is smoothed via a four
quarter moving average in a second step. The annual and quarterly raw data as well
as the de-seasoned weighted annual series are shown in ￿gure 1.
The series follow similar trends over time and thus provide only limited reason
for concern regarding signi￿cant changes of their respective informational content.
But naturally, any approach to distribute the annual distress series across quarters
is inherently heuristic.19 The ￿rst reason for the suitability of this approach is in
our case that the quarterly series used to construct the weighting scheme is closely
related to the de￿nition of distress according to regulatory authorities. Instead of
using some correlated variable without a necessarily meaningful economic relation,
the data we exploit forms the major share of raw data to generate the distress
database of the Bundesbank. Hence, the information contained in these data should
not contaminate our estimates of probabilities of distress. It might, however, add
measurement error regarding the exact timing of events.
As a robustness check, we also execute an alternative approach to tackling the
frequency mismatch and estimate the integrated model on a quarterly basis. Aware
17For example, category III events contain capital injections, which could not be included in the
quarterly series since data are only available annually.
18For instance, a number of events are only recorded at the end of the year.
19Di￿erent periodicity in macroeconomic studies is a frequently encountered problem. See Schu-
macher and Breitung (2006) for a discussion and a suggested remedy.
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of the uncertainty about the exact timing of the distressed events, we estimate
(1) where the left hand side information now originates from the raw quarterly
distress data. For the right hand side variables, the balance sheet variables are
assumed constant while the true quarterly macro aggregates are incorporated. A
similar approach is used in Jacobson et al. (2005).
According parameter estimates of the micro model are depicted in table 8 in
the appendix. Additional measurement error in the quarterly model appears to be
present as shown by a lower R2 of around 8.2%. However, the discriminatory power
deteriorates only slightly from an AUR value of 77 to 76. This indicates that the
periodicity transformation does not change the informational content of the regres-
sors for the PD measure substantially. Importantly, and in line with Jacobson et al.
(2005), parameters of bank-speci￿c covariates are hardly a￿ected in terms of the
direction of e￿ects, their signi￿cance, and magnitude. This is comforting given the
dominant contribution of bank-speci￿c rather than macroeconomic e￿ects in the
hazard model. Macro parameters mimic this result with the exception of the esti-
mate of the coe￿cient of the interest rate. Its change, however, does not necessarily
imply that according responses simulated for the monetary shock are spurious. This,
in turn, depends ultimately on the resulting responses of bank distress to monetary
shocks, which we discuss in section 4.3 below.
4 Results
We ￿rst analyze the e￿ects of monetary policy shocks on ￿nancial distress in the
combined micro-macro system. Subsequently, we present evidence on the importance
of the micro-macro interdependence in this model, the robustness of results relative
12to an alternative periodicity treatment, as well as detailed evidence according to
di￿erent types of distress and capitalization states of the banking industry.
4.1 The aggregate response
Figure 2 plots the median impulse response functions and corresponding con￿dence
intervals of all variables in the system to a monetary policy shock. The impulse
responses are annual.20 Therefore, a one standard deviation increase of the interest
rate of around 0.1%, is compatible with, e.g., a two quarter increase of 20 basis
points, or a one quarter increase of 40 basis points. On the macro side, this reduces
GDP growth and in￿ation with 0.2 and 0.15%, respectively, during the ￿rst year.
These magnitudes are comparable to other monetary VARs. 21
Figure 2: PD response to monetary shock with feedback
While the instantaneous response of the probability of distress is insigni￿cant,
our results indicate a signi￿cant deterioration of PDs in response to a monetary
contraction after one year. Quantitatively the period 1 median response is 0.44%.
Though this may seem small at ￿rst sight, it amounts to about one third of the an-
nual standard deviation of the distress frequency. A variance decomposition depicted
in table 4 con￿rms the quantitative signi￿cance of this response. Up to about one
third of the variance of distress can be accounted for by monetary policy shocks. At
the same time, the portion of variance explained of the macro variables is in line with
20Recall that the macro model is estimated quarterly but rewritten in annual form, in order to
align its frequency with that of the micro data.
21Smets and Wouters (1999) report for Germany virtually identical point estimates.
13extant macroeconomic research. Monetary shocks are not one of the main drivers of
real ￿uctuations. On average, they explain about ten percent of the forecast error
variance of growth and in￿ation.
Table 4: Variance decomposition of the integrated model
Variable Bounds
Lower Upper
Y Change in real GDP 2% 19%
P In￿ation 2% 17%
R Interest rate (3 months) 1% 8%
D Distress frequency 5% 35%
The signi￿cant increase in the distress frequency is important since it shows that
monetary policy a￿ects the soundness of the banking sector. While qualitatively in
line with Jacobson et al. (2005), our result di￿ers in terms of timing since it con-
tradicts the immediate PD response reported for the Swedish economy. A potential
explanation could relate to the fact that they measure corporate default probabil-
ities. Thus, the result for the German sample might re￿ect that corporate distress
relates to bank distress with some lag. An economic rational is that especially banks
possess expertise to form expectations and insure against changes in monetary pol-
icy while corporates do not (to that degree of sophistication). Hence, a monetary
contraction might have no signi￿cant instantaneous impact on bank PDs. This seems
also reasonable from a more technical angle since the discriminating power of the
hazard rate model is primarily determined by the micro variation across banks rather
than macroeconomic e￿ects. However, since the integrated model allows for contin-
uous interaction between the real and the ￿nancial sector, bank PDs may respond
later when solvency pressure on corporates is passed on to banks balance sheets, for
example in terms of more non-performing loans and deteriorating pro￿tability.
Alternatively, our approach to estimate an annual model may simply camou￿age
some of the intra-annual dynamics. The lack of a fully covered quarterly bank dis-
tress series and, more importantly, according bank-speci￿c covariates prohibits in
our view an ultimate answer to this question. However, we consider below the quali-
tative implications for the aggregate response based on the quarterly PD estimations
assuming constant bank-speci￿c covariates during the year and a quarterly VAR.
Beforehand, we consider the importance to allow explicitly for the micro-macro in-
terdependence.
4.2 The importance of micro aspects and non-linearities
Importantly, the identi￿ed interdependence between monetary policy and bank PDs
does not emerge in a traditional VAR. The absence of a signi￿cant change in bank
distress probabilities is shown in ￿gure 3.
The impulse responses shown are those of a plain VAR on (Y, P, R, PD). In such
an approach, the aggregate frequency of distress is solely explained on the basis of
14Figure 3: PD response in a plain VAR
macro data, without accounting for micro-e￿ects as is done in the integrated model.
The ￿gure shows that, based on a standard VAR which does neither account for
micro data nor non-linearities, we ￿nd no e￿ect of the policy shock on the frequency
of distress. The deceptive absence of a PD response is in line with Jacobson et al.
(2005), who also report no impact of a policy shock on ￿rm distress when ignoring
the micro side of the data. Our result underlines the importance to allow for possible
repercussions of monetary policy at the bank-level, as stated in many central banks’
wishlists for macro-stress testing analyses (ECB, 2006).
The importance of the micro e￿ects is not only intuitively appealing, but also
economically reasonable. While bank PDs may depend to some extent on macroe-
conomic conditions, too, most of the historical distress incidents are explained by
bank-speci￿c factors such as capitalization, pro￿tability and asset quality. Direct
e￿ects of temporary and moderate changes in monetary policy are thus unlikely
to a￿ect aggregate bank PDs signi￿cantly. However, a monetary contraction’s well-
documented depression of output may very well a￿ect some banks’ ￿nancial accounts
through it’s e￿ect on their borrowers and ￿nancial markets in subsequent feedback
e￿ects. In an environment of stable in￿ation and growth, Borio (2006) cautions that
a process can unfold where demand side pressure paired with a misperception of
risk and wealth as well as looser credit constraints foster the build-up of ￿nancial
imbalances of ￿rms and households. Excessive demand side pressure may then entail
failure of ￿nancial institutions to build up su￿cient bu￿ers but to rely, for example
on ￿nancial markets to hedge risks (Dri￿ll et al., 2006). These may shield banks from
instantaneous e￿ects in response to e￿orts by central banks to control in￿ation. But
their customers’ imbalances will dynamically lead to deteriorating determinants of
bank distress in subsequent periods. The crucial importance of such dynamic e￿ects
(and potential non-linearities) has also been raised by Poloz (2006), who cautions
that failure to account for the former may render inference futile.
154.3 Is it the data?
In section 3.4 we considered to what extent the micro component of the model is
a￿ected by the periodicity transformation of the bank failure series. Here, we test
whether the identi￿ed relation between monetary policy and bank PDs is driven
by the frequency transformation of the latter. Following the approach laid out in
section 3 we use a quarterly hazard rate model together with a quarterly VAR to
simulate responses for a monetary shock.
The according results in ￿gure 4 by and large con￿rm the results obtained previ-
ously from an annual VAR. The magnitude of PD response in an integrated model
is strikingly similar to that reported for the annual model depicted in ￿gure 2. Note
that the response of distress is obscured in a plain quarterly VAR. This result is
identical to the one obtained from the annual model.
Figure 4: Distress responses from a quarterly integrated model and a plain VAR
This corroborates our earlier identi￿cation of a signi￿cant relation between mon-
etary policy and bank PDs and the importance to consider both the micro and
macro component of the model explicitly. But we do ￿nd di￿erences in terms of
dynamics regarding the integrated model. In the quarterly model, responses show a
signi￿cant instantaneous e￿ect, which lasts for one period. The fact that the timing
of the response is di￿erent is not too surprising, given the substantial uncertainty
surrounding the exact (quarterly) timing of events in the raw data. In fact, it un-
derpins our earlier cautioning with regards to the precise timing of events predicted
by the model for this sample. However, it also demonstrates that the absence of
instantaneous PD responses to a tighter monetary stance documented by Jacobson
16et al. (2005) is not merely the result from di￿erences in the methodological set-up
pursued here.22
4.4 Dissecting the evidence: Types of distress
We also acknowledge the argument raised by Oshinsky and Olin (2006) that banks
hardly ever face only two options: to fail or not to fail. In contrast, the nature of
events that we observe describes diverse degrees of distress. We investigate how
the four increasingly severe subcategories of ￿nancial strain de￿ned in section 2
are a￿ected by policy shocks. The categories we consider are labeled as "automatic
signals" (category I), "warnings by the ￿nancial authority" (category II), "measures
by the ￿nancial authority" (category III) and "defaults and acquisitions" (category
IV) in ￿gure 5. We plot how each of these categories respond to monetary policy
shocks.
Figure 5: Distress responses across types of distress
The ￿gure shows that predominantly events of the relatively weak category II "warn-
ings by the ￿nancial authority" respond signi￿cantly. This response closely resembles
the aggregate response of ￿gure 2. Thus, following a monetary restriction, about 0.40
percent of banks run into di￿culties, causing an o￿cial warning. 80% of the events
within this category comprise admonishment hearings, disapproval, serious letters
and warnings to the CEO.
22For example, a lagged relation between macroeconomic conditions and bank distress in the
micro component of the integrated model.
17The response of the automatic signals is also signi￿cant, though substantially
smaller. However, it’s response may underestimate the actual impact, because in
the case of simultaneous events, only the most severe event is registered. The most
severe categories III "measures by the ￿nancial authority" and IV "defaults and
acquisitions" show no systematic reaction to the stance of monetary policy. 23
These results suggest two implications. First, monetary policy shocks alone do
not cause supervisors to prohibit certain bank activities, or worse, close the bank.
This is not too surprising: the more severe corrective actions seem to be closer
related to structural de￿ciencies of a bank rather than a change in the monetary
stance. Second, and related, a number of banks appear to have entered business
activities that brought the bank to the verge of early indications of distress. While
monetary shocks are unlikely to take a bank out of business due to outright failure,
an increasingly competitive environment could have induced managers to exhaust
the risk-taking capacities of their business just before catching regulatory attention.
A monetary shock could then induce a fairly large portion of institutes to tumble
over the rim and be put on the watchlist of supervisors.
4.5 Banking sector capitalization and the resilience to shocks
It is reasonable to suspect that the relation between monetary policy and bank PD’s
is subjected to initial conditions. Speci￿cally, we analyze wether the e￿ects of mon-
etary policy shocks di￿er depending on the degree of banking sector capitalization.
Our focus on capitalization is motivated, on the one hand, from a monetary policy
perspective. The literature on the bank lending channel has emphasized the impor-
tance of banks’ ￿nancial health, and capitalization in particular, as an important
driver in the transmission of monetary policy shocks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000).
The importance of the bank lending channel in Germany is documented in, among
others, Kakes and Sturm (2002). On the other hand, from a supervisory perspective,
capital regulations have been at the center of banking regulations throughout our
sample period. Moreover, capitalization is one of the most important determinants
of bank distress in both our sample and other countries (Wheelock and Wilson,
2000; King et al., 2006).
To infer the e￿ect of banking sector capitalization on the transmission of shocks,
we simulate the system under two di￿erent initial conditions. The experiment con-
trasts the e￿ect of a monetary policy shock at a time when the banking sector is
poorly capitalized, with the e￿ects of such a shock in a state where ￿nancial health
(i.e. capitalization) is high. Capital is de￿ned in terms of both our capitalization
measures in the hazard model, equity and reserves. In Germany in particular, banks
use mostly their reserves to adjust regulatory capital (Porath, 2006). The ’low’
(’high’) initial state is de￿ned as one in which average banking sector capitalization
is one standard deviation below (above) its mean. Figure 6 compares the e￿ect of a
monetary policy shock on the probability of distress in both these states.
23Note that since these categories are the most severe, and the severest is always recorded, their
non-response is not potentially underestimated.
18Figure 6: Distress responses for di￿erent capitalization states
First note that irrespective of the state considered, distress increases signi￿cantly
following the monetary policy impulse. Second, quantitatively, the response in the
highly capitalized scenario is much smaller relative to both the baseline model and
the low-capital scenario. Monetary policy shocks have a very strong e￿ect on banking
sector distress when the latter’s ￿nancial health is poor. In particular, the e￿ect is
approximately six times as large in the poorly capitalized state relative to the well
capitalized state.
From the monetary policy perspective, these ￿ndings con￿rm the importance of
banks’ ￿nancial health in the transmission of monetary policy shocks. Potentially,
higher bank distress might constrain their loan supply, either through increasing
di￿culties to obtain loanable funds or through restrictions imposed by the regula-
tor. These di￿erent e￿ects may in￿uence the strength of the bank lending channel
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000). For example, Kishan and Opiela (2000) report
that poorly capitalized U.S. banks exhibit a signi￿cantly stronger loan contraction
response to monetary shocks compared to large, well-capitalized banks. Note, how-
ever, that we do not model loan supply responses here explicitly and therefore cau-
tion to draw ￿rmer inference regarding the bank lending channel without modeling
it more explicitly.
5 Conclusion
We provide in this study empirical evidence on the relation between monetary policy
and bank distress. Our approach rests on an integrated micro-macro model and we
aim at two main contributions. First, we measure the soundness of banks directly
at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeco-
nomic hazard model for bank distress with a standard macroeconomic model. The
19advantage of the approach followed is that it incorporates micro information, allows
for non-linearities and allows for general feedback e￿ects between ￿nancial distress
and the real economy. Our analysis is based on bank and macro data for all univer-
sal banks operating in Germany between 1995 and 2004. Our main ￿ndings are as
follows.
We provide empirical evidence on the relation between monetary policy and
the ￿nancial soundness of banks. A tightening of monetary policy by one standard
deviation increases the average probability of bank distress by 0.44% after one year.
While we point out that inference regarding the exact timing of dynamics remains
subject to care due to data limitations, the magnitude of this e￿ect is robust to an
alternative speci￿cation of the model in quarterly periodicity akin to Jacobson et al.
(2005).
This signi￿cant e￿ect can not be identi￿ed if we employ a model that fails to
account for microeconomic and non-linear e￿ects. Hence, the necessity to model
the intricate dynamics between macroeconomic measures targeted for (monetary)
policy making and microeconomic measures of the ￿nancial soundness of banks is
con￿rmed.
Our results suggest a signi￿cant relation between monetary policy and weak
forms of bank distress, but no evidence of monetary policy igniting outright bank
failures. The disaggregation of the baseline result into four increasingly severe dis-
tress events further suggests that absorbing failure events, such as restructuring
mergers or outright closures of banks, are unlikely triggered by monetary shocks. In
turn, the likelihood of weaker distress events, which are the most frequent ones in
this sample, increase the most.
Finally, we ￿nd that the e￿ect of monetary policy shocks on bank PDs is sub-
stantially larger if capitalization is low. The resulting increase in distress is both
statistically and economically signi￿cant and details a route through which the bank
lending channel may generate real e￿ects: An exacerbated PD response for poorly
capitalized banks might imply higher re-￿nancing costs of banks that lead to a more
pronounced reduction of loan supply compared to well-capitalized banks. In that
sense, our results are in line with Kishan and Opiela (2000) who also stress the
importance of bank capitalization for monetary transmission.
A number of limitations of this study outline the scope for future research. First,
we do not investigate here possible contagion e￿ects among banks. Alternative meth-
ods, such as extreme value theory, might encompass and focus on this aspect. Second,
we do neither investigate responses to bank distress shocks nor further shocks that
are of importance to policy makers, for example oil price or ￿scal policy shocks, too.
Theoretical work on the identi￿cation of such scenarios would be insightful. Third,
we treat the vector of bank-speci￿c hazard determinants as exogenous. Future work
might aim to endogenize these micro components since asset quality, capitalization,
or bank pro￿tability are most likely also related to macroeconomic developments.
Finally, endeavors towards a measure of ￿nancial distress encompassing other agents,
institutions, and ￿nancial markets beyond the banking industry is necessary as to
capture the stability of the entire ￿nancial system in future research.
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23Appendix A: Reduced form of the integrated model
The reduced form combines the VAR and the micro equation. The system is esti-
mated equation by equation. In principle, one may apply SUR corrections in the
reduced form, yet these are negligible. The VAR is (assuming one lag for ease of
exposition):
Yt = a11Yt−1 + a12Pt−1 + a13Rt−1 + a14PDt−1 + e1
Pt = a21Yt−1 + a22Pt−1 + a23Rt−1 + a24PDt−1 + e2
Rt = a31Yt−1 + a32Pt−1 + a33Rt−1 + a34PDt−1 + e3
The data generating process for the distress rate implied by the micro model (1) is:
PDt = a41Yt−1 + a42Pt−1 + a43Rt−1 + e4
where the coe￿cients a4. are the marginal e￿ects of (1) and balance sheet charac-









(1 + eβX+πZt−1)2πY = p(1 − p)πY
where πY is the estimated coe￿cient for Y in the micro equation (1), reported in




Analogous de￿nitions apply for marginal e￿ects of the interest rate ( R) and in￿ation
(P). The reduced form (3) consists of these ￿rst four equations. In computing impulse
responses, the reduced form is transformed similar as when going from VAR to
SVAR. The di￿erence, however, is that the coe￿cients a4. are non-linear and adapt
each period depending on the macroeconomic state. In the exercise of Section 4.6,
we condition on di￿erent levels of X
24Appendix B: Tables and ￿gures
Table 5: Mean CAMEL covariates per distress category
Variable All Distress category
I II III IV
Equity ratio c1 8.45 9.98 7.77 7.54 8.22
Total reserves c2 0.93 0.48 0.72 0.36 0.44
Customer loans a1 11.13 13.58 12.98 15.38 13.83
O￿-balance sheet a2 3.14 3.00 3.07 3.96 3.62
Size a3 19.22 19.63 19.20 19.24 19.03
RoE e1 14.80 1.08 7.30 1.46 2.99
Liquidity l1 6.70 8.71 7.69 7.92 7.63
Change in real GDP m1 1.70 1.56 1.56 1.73 1.79
In￿ation m2 0.92 0.82 0.68 0.89 0.65
Interest (3 months) m3 3.79 3.84 3.59 3.78 3.69
Observations 26,012 88 446 252 347
All variables measured in percent except size; c1: Core capital to risk-weighted assets; c2:
reserves to total assets; a1: Customer loans to total assets; a2: O￿ balance sheet activities to
total assets; a3: log of total assets; e1: Return on equity; l1: Net interbank assets and cash
to total assets
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Year
25Table 6: Logit model parameters per distress categories
All Distress categories
Variable I II III IV
Equity ratio -0.0787*** 0.0130 -0.1346*** -0.1536*** -0.0608**
Total reserves -0.7558*** -0.9732*** -0.2981*** -1.5298*** -1.2238***
Customer loans 0.0224*** 0.0166* 0.0210*** 0.0292*** 0.0193***
O￿-balance sheet -0.0038 -0.0727* -0.0361** 0.0181 0.0124
Size -0.0547*** 0.1462** -0.0558* -0.0614 -0.1516***
RoE -0.0411*** -0.0354*** -0.0327*** -0.0377*** -0.0377***
Liquidity 0.0286*** 0.0161 0.0363*** 0.0327*** 0.0156*
Change in real GDP -0.2988*** -1.4865*** -0.5429*** 0.0953 -0.0295
In￿ation -0.5222*** -1.4000*** -0.7782*** -0.0323 -0.4512***
Interest (3 months) 0.2117** 1.9196*** 0.3566** -0.2239 -0.0538
Constant -0.7354 -11.3544*** -1.4457* -0.8691 0.5311
Observations 26012 24967 25325 25131 25226
R-squared 0.1133 0.1218 0.068 0.1515 0.1199
AUR1) 0.7741 0.8354 0.7395 0.8501 0.7963
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote signi￿cant at the 1,5,10 percent
level, respectively. For variable descriptions see table 5. 1)Area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristics curve (Hosmer and Lemshow, 2000).
Table 7: Logit model neglecting macroeconomic covariates
All Distress categories
Variable I II III IV
Equity ratio -0.0751*** 0.0107 -0.128*** -0.1497*** -0.0562**
Total reserves -0.6885*** -0.8495*** -0.2148*** -1.4978*** -1.1476***
Customer loans 0.0188*** 0.0144 0.0158*** 0.0274*** 0.0156***
O￿-balance sheet -0.0108 -0.0935** -0.0476** 0.0153 0.0065
Size -0.0315 0.191*** -0.0206 -0.052 -0.1309***
RoE -0.043*** -0.0387*** -0.0354*** -0.0382*** -0.0387***
Liquidity 0.0287*** 0.0224** 0.0382*** 0.0313*** 0.012
Constant -1.3072** -8.5205*** -2.3024*** -1.764* -0.4521
Observations 26,012 24,967 25,325 25,131 25,226
R-squared 0.103 0.095 0.051 0.149 0.106
AUR 0.766 0.826 0.723 0.850 0.784
Notes: see Table 6.
Table 8: Quarterly and annual hazard parameters compared
Quarterly logit model of bank distress. Bank-speci￿c covariates are lagged by four
quarters as in Jacobson et al. (2005). Coe￿cients for macroeconomic covariates denote
cumulative e￿ects.
Quarterly Annual
Equity ratio -0.096*** -0.0787***
Total reserves -0.631*** -0.7558***
Customer loans 0.008*** 0.0224***




Change in real GDP -0.603*** -0.2988***
In￿ation -0.279** -0.5222***
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